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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was br.ought to condemn for highway 
purposes 7.8~ acres of pasture land owned by defendants 
and used by them in the operation of a dairy farm in 
Wasatch County. The entire tract, prior to the taking 
for the highway, contained 131.79 acres (Tr. 4, Exhibit 
A). After the taking, two small portions of pasture land 
. were left to the north .of the new right-of-way, one con-
sisting of 3.28 acres and the other, 1.21 acres. The case 
was tried to the .court without a jury. The trial judge 
determined the value of the property take~ to be $2,564.-
2·5, computed on the average value per acre of $325.00 
(Finding of F·act No. 10). Plaintiffs accept this finding, 
and _no issue is raised on appeal as to the judgment for 
the value of the land actually taken. 
In Finding of Fact No. 11 the trial court determined 
the severance damages, or the damage to the remainder 
of land not taken, to be $10,919.57, and entered judgment 
accordingly. It is as to this portion of the judgment that 
plaintiffs seek a review. 
The 7.89 acres taken by plaintiffs was a portion of 
a larger tract of pasturage, containing, before the taking, 
131.79 acres (Tr. 4). Thi~_iproperty was acquired by de-
fendants several years ago, and used in constructing and 
operating a dairy ranch in conne-ction with the welfare 
program of the Mormon church. It was not used as a 
dairy pasturage prior to defendants' purchase (Tr. 22). 
At the time of acquiring this tract, defendants acquired 
another tract, to the north and west and across U. S. 
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HiglnYay K o. 40. The~e t\\~O tracts \Vere clain1ed by de-
fendant~ to be one unit and they asked for damages to· 
the latter trart \Yith all ilnprovements thereon, although 
the latter tract \Yas not touched in any way by this con-
demnation ... A.ll the in1prove1nents constructed by defend-
ant~ in connection 'vith the creation and op·eration of the 
dairy far1n 'vere placed upon the tract lying to the north 
and 'vest of lT. S. High,vay 40, and no improvements 
were constructed on the tract, a part of which plaintiff 
took by this action. 
Defendants, over plaintiff's objection,· presented 
their case on the theory that the plain tiffs, by the taking 
of 7.89 acres pasture land from the tract of 131.79 acres, 
damaged the entire dairy farm as a going business; that 
the entire farm, as an operating unit, had been severely 
damaged by the taking of less than eight acres of pasture 
land (Tr. 20ff). Defendants' witnesses testified, with 
surprising unanimity, that the dairy farm, as an operat-
ing unit, had been depreciated twenty per cent, though 
there was no evidence offered that a price had been of-
fered for the unit, either before or after the taking by 
plaintiff. 
Defendants operated the farm by pasturing cattle 
on the land owned or leased by them and feeding the 
cattle in the \vinter with feed contributed by their mem-
bers. 
It is plaintiffs' position that defendants were en-
titled to the judgment of $2,564.25 for the 7.89 acres of 
pasture land taken. We raise no question that defend-
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ants were also entitled to severance damages for the 
depreciation in value of the two small portions of pasture 
land left to the north of the land taken and thus cut off 
from the defendants' main pasture land. We assert that 
the allowance of $10,919.57 for severance damages cannot 
be supported in law or on the evidence, and is on its face 
error. Additional facts developed at the trial will be 
indicated, in the course of the argument, in support of 
our position. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WILL NOT SUPPORT 
THE DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
OR THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD THEREOF, FOR THE 
REASON THAT THE DAIRY FARM IS NOT A UNIT OPER-
ATION, AND ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAIL-
ABLE TO DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE WILL NOT SUPPORT 
THE DEFENDANTS' THEORY OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES 
OR THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD THEREOF, FOR THE 
REASON THAT THE DAIRY FARM IS NOT A UNIT OPER-
ATION, AND ADDITIONAL PASTURE LAND WAS AVAIL-
ABLE TO DEFENDANTS. 
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The statute here in question is Section 104-34-10, 
Chapter 58, La\Ys of r:·tah 1951, \Yhich, so far as n1aterial 
here, provides : 
The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal eYidence as 1nay be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must 
ascertain and assess: 
* * * * 
(2) If the property sought to be condemned 
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the 
damages which \vill accrue to the portion not 
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance 
from the portion sought to be condemned and the 
construction of the improvem_ents in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. 
There is no question in this case but what defendants 
are entitled to severance damages to the two small par-
cels of pasture land to the north of the new right-of-way 
by virtue of their being isolated from the remainder of 
the pasturage. The allowance of $10,919.57 as severance 
damages is so out of proportion to the value of that land, 
were it deemed completely useless as a result of the 
condemnation, that one can only conclude this amount 
was awarded on the theory that the reduction in acreage 
of pasture land damaged the entire dairy operation, and 
that it was impossible to replace such land. This theory, 
the law and the facts will not support. The measure of 
damages in such a case as this ~s the diminution in value 
of the remaining tract, caused by the taking. State et al 
v. Ward et al, 112 Utah 452, 189 P. 2d 113. The defend-
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ants' dairy simply was not diminished in value to that ex-
tent by the taking of approximately 6% of its p·asturag~. 
As pointed out, defendants' witnesses were practi-
cally u~animous in their assertion that the dairy, . as a 
going business,. was depreciated through the taking by 
twenty per cent. They were not unanimous in their basis 
for arriving at this figure. Th~ir case was probably best 
stated by their witness, H. Clay Cummings. He testified, 
over plaintiffs' objection, that he valued the property at 
$100,000.00 before and $80,000.00 after the taking (Tr. 
33). He arrived at the value of the farm by taking into 
consideration the 3.:mount e_xpended by defendants in im-
proving it.. This, we submit, is not the prQper measure, 
State v. Ward, supra. On cross examination he testified 
that he arriv~d at the valu~ of $80,000.00 after the taking 
by depreciating, by 20%, all the improvements con-
structed including the 'house, dairy barns, corrals and 
even the personal p-rop·erty such as pitchforks etc. used 
on the farm (Tr. 34~44). And this, though none of the 
improvements were on the tract, a portion of which was 
taken! 
The testimony of Mr. Broadbent, Professor of Agri-
culture at the Utah State Agricultural College (Tr. 98 
ff) indicates that he arrived at the 20 percent deprecia-
tion in the value of the dairy farm by a somewhat differ-
ent process. He testified that the improvements built on 
the dairy ranch had a capacity of ap·proximately 100 
cows, and that they should have at least 60 as a mini1num 
for economical op·eration (Tr. 100). His testimony was to 
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the effect that the taking of the 7.89 acres by the State 
reduced the pasturage to the point where it would not 
support the n1inin1um economical number of cows. This 
testimony "'"as offered on the theory that the land taken· 
\vas absolutely irreplaceable. ....l\..part from the legal ques-
tions involved, the facts si1nply will not support this 
theory ... A.s \Vill be shown hereafter, other land was avail-
able to the defendants for use as pasturage. Further, 
pasture land in that vicinity is usable as such for at most 
six months of the year (Tr. 51, 52, 219). Defendants pro-
duce or raise no other feed for their cattle, but rather 
procure it fro1n their membership as contributions (Tr. 
52, 219). All feed except for pasturage is procured by de-
fendants from contributions of members of the Stake and 
none of it is produced on the dairy farm (Tr. 220). Fur-
ther, at the time of the trial, more than a year after the 
taking of the property by the plaintiffs, the defendants 
were running more cattle (Tr. 51) than before, and no 
testimony was offered showing that efficiency or produc-
tion had changed by the taking. Mr. Young testified 
(Tr. 217) that prior to the taking defendants ran from 
100 to 105 head of cattle and at the tune of the. trial, 110 
head of cattle (Tr. 218). In fact production increased. 
For the year ending October 1946, defendants milked an 
average of 20 cows (Exh. C). F·or the year ending Octo-
ber 1947, they milked 22 cows (Exh. D) and for the year 
ending in October after the taking of the land by the state 
they milked an average of 47 cows (Exh. E). 
, 
The only theory, if any there be, upon which the 
award of $10,919.57 severance damages can be main-
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tained is that the total pasturage available to defend-
ants prior to the taking by the plaintiff of the 7.89 acres 
is absolutely essent~al to the operation of the defendants' 
dairy farm, that this land is irreplaceable, and that the 
entire dairy operation has been damaged, in addition to 
the land taken, to that extent. The facts will not support 
this theory because the record shows that additional 
land was available. First, at the time of the taking the 
defendants were renting from the New Park Mining 
· Company an area · of approximately 160 acres to the 
north of the present properties (Tr. 229-30), and were 
expending time and money improving this property. In 
addition thereto the record shows that at the time of 
the taking of this property the State offered to procure 
from one Don Berg 15.3 acres immediately adjacent to 
the defendants' pasture land to the south and east, sepa-
rated from the present pasture tract by only a fence (Tr. 
72, 313). The record further shows that this pasturage is 
as good as the rest of the pasture land of the defendants 
~ 
and could easily be used by it in connection with its dairy 
operation. The defendants simply were not restricted 
in available pasture acreage by this action. 
We believe the law regarding severance damages 
where a part only of the tract is taken is well stated in 
4 Nichols, Eminent Domain, (3rd edition) p. 307-308. 
In determining the extent of an owner's re-
mainder area and its relationship to the parcel 
taken consideration is given to the physical con- . 
ditions which exist and not to the manne-r in which 
the land is utilized by an owner. The parcel taken 
10 
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and the re1nainder area must, prior to the taking, 
haYe constituted a single physical unit. Where 
t'Yo physically separated tracts of the same owner 
are operated as a unit by the owner and only one 
of such tracts is affected by a partial taking, the 
unity of operation is not in and of itself sufficient 
to Ineri t consideration of the second tract as part 
of the remainder area. 
This court in the case of Provo River Water Use-rs' 
Association v. Carleson et al., 103 Utah 93, 133 P. 2d 
277 considered a siinilar problem. There, the plaintiffs 
had condemn~d pastureland belonging to the defendant, 
the taking of 'vhich, defendant claimed, had damaged the 
remainder of his farm. The jury rendered a ve-rdict 
granting such damages. The court reversed, ·stating: 
.rill of the cases in this court, which we have 
been able to find, h~ve predicated both severance 
damages and damages to lands not taken, on .some 
physical injury to lands not condemned, such as 
lowering or raising the level. of a street or high-. 
way so as to impair access, obstruction of light 
and view, restriction of the remaining area in 
size or shape so as to render it less valuable for 
purposes to which it was formerly adapted, or 
the creation of noise, smoke, or some other condi-
tion which would operate to depreciate tlie market 
value of the property remaining. 
In the cited case it was further pointed out that the 
facts would not support the plaintiffs' theory of sever-
ance damages in any event for the reason that there was 
no indication in the record that additional land was not 
available to the defendant. In this case, there is no ques-
tion but that additional land was available to the defend-
11 
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ants. Fnrther, this additional land was offered to the de-
fendants and th~y refused to buy it (Tr. 77). It is true 
the defendants' witness testified that they refused to pur-
chase this additional land because the price was too high 
($4,000.00) but even if we were to grant that it was high 
this is indeed strange behavior on behalf of the defend-
ants when they assert that the taking of the 7.89 acres 
substantially destroy~d the efficiency of their entire 
operation. Furthermore, in the instant case there is no 
evidence that aceess to the remaining property was im-
paired, no evidence it cannot be used for the same pur-
poses as previously; no evidence o.f smoke or noise or 
anything that would depreciate the· market value of the 
remaining property. 
We appreciate the rule of law that the defendant in 
a condemnation case is entitled to· the value of the lands 
taken and the damages to the remainder, if any, in money 
and that h~ cannot be compelled to accept substitute land 
elsewhere. However, as pointed out in the case of City 
o:f St. Louis v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 272 Mo. 80, 
197 S.W. 107 the matter of the availability of additional 
land is mate·rial in the question of damages to· the re-
mainder and to a going business conducted upon the re-
mainder. This testimony that the Berg property con-
sisting of 15.3 acres separated from the defendants' 
pasture ·by merely a fence, completely destroys the de-
fendants.' theory that by the taking of 7.89 acres from the 
131.79 acres the defendants' operation has been reduced 
·below the efficient minimum level and thus ·damaged the 
dairy farm irreparably. 
12 
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This theory is further destroyed by the testilnony 
offered on behalf of the defendants that a year and a half 
after the taking of the 7.89 acres defendants we·re run-
ning more cattle than they 'vere prior to the taking and 
that the defendants "\vere continuously engaged in im-
proving the additional lands so as to increase the pasture 
carrying capacity of the farn1. Defendants' theory is 
further destroyed by testimony offered on their behalf 
that all of the feed for their cattle comes from sources 
separate and apart from the farm in question. They 
would have us believe that the dairy farm in Wasatch 
County is a self-contained unit operated as such self-
contained unit when in fact it is not. The record shows 
that the defendants at the time of trial had approxi-
mately 110 head of cattle on the farm (Tr. 218) yet ac-
cording to the testimony the best portions of the 131.79 
acre tract would support only two cows per acre and the 
poorest a mere fraction of a cow per acre during the six 
months pasture season. Furthermore, one of the defend-
ants' witnesses testified that the improvements consist-
ing of the feeding and lounging facilities had a capacity 
of 60 cows and at the time of the trial defendants were 
feeding and lounging approximately 55 head (Tr. 226-
227). This sarne witness testified that some dairies are 
operated commercially without any or with very little 
pasturage (Tr. 225-226). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants, over plaintiffs' objection, were permit-
13 
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ted to try their case on the theory that the Wasatch 
c·ounty dairy farrn was a unit operation, and that the 
taking of the 7.89 acres by plaintiffs destroyed the effi-
cient operation of the unit. To support this theory, it 
was necessary for defendants to establish the unity of 
operation, and that additional pasture land was not avail-
able to replace that taken. The trial court, in awarding 
severance damages of $10,919.57; adopted this theory. 
We respectfully submit that the evidence will sup-
port neither premise. The dairy farm was in fact never 
operated as a unit geared in its capacity to the size and 
nature of the pasture land available, and the evidence 
further shows that additional pasturage in ample 
amounts was, at the time of the taking, available to de-
fendants. 
Defendants are unquestionably entitled to sever-
ance damages for the two small tracts lying to the east 
and north of the right-of-way taken. They are not en-
titled to the sum awarded. We ask this court to remand 
the case for the purpose of properly assessing such 
severance damages. 
· C·LINTON D. VERNON 
Attorney General 
J. LAMBERT GIBSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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